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Monetary policy in the euro area is conducted within a multi-country, multi-
cultural, and multi-lingual context involving multiple central banking traditions. 
How does this heterogeneity affect the ability of economic agents to understand and 
to anticipate monetary policy by the ECB? Using a database of surveys of 
professional ECB policy forecasters in 24 countries, we find remarkable differences 
in forecast accuracy, and show that they are partly related to geography and 
clustering around informational hubs, as well as to country-specific economic 
conditions and traditions of independent central banking in the past. In large part 
this heterogeneity can be traced to differences in forecasting models. While some 
systematic differences between analysts have been transitional and are indicative of 
learning, others are more persistent. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Monetary policy in the euro area is conducted within a multi-country, multi-cultural, and 
multi-lingual context. With the formation of the European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), countries with markedly different histories of inflation, monetary policy strategies, 
and central banking traditions, delegated the conduct of monetary policy to a single entity--the 
European Central Bank (ECB). Since this transition, questions that have come to the fore 
include whether economic agents in different member countries have been able to adjust and 
understand equally well the European perspective of monetary policy? To what extent are 
expectations about monetary policy still influenced by different national and cultural 
backgrounds? Moreover, to what extent may differences in the ability to forecast monetary 
policy decisions reflect more permanent information asymmetries related to geographic 
proximity to the ECB, and country-specific factors? While random heterogeneity in forecasts 
will characterize many uncertain environments, the presence of systematic heterogeneity is 
important from a policy perspective. Expectations are a crucial transmission channel for 
monetary policy, and systematic heterogeneity linked to, for instance, geographical factors 
can imply that monetary policy in the euro area exerts differential effects in the various EMU 
countries.  
 
This paper analyzes the ability of economic agents in EMU and non-EMU countries to 
forecast monetary policy decisions by the ECB. In particular, we investigate to what extent 
expectations are related to geographic location and distance, country-specific characteristics, 
and the history of central bank independence of the country in which forecasters are located. 
We develop a novel database of monetary policy expectations by professional financial 
analysts from 120 institutions in 24 countries between 1999 and 2005. The data stem from 
surveys conducted by Reuters, and provide information on the expected ECB policy rate for 
the upcoming Governing Council meeting, the probability distribution around analysts’ point 
estimates, as well as their expectations about future monetary policy steps. The survey 
responses represent a highly accurate measure of analysts’ expectations for two reasons. First, 
they are generally in the public domain, which implies that they must be in line with the 
recommendations given by the institutions to their clients. Second, as most institutions 
participate regularly, clients have the possibility to evaluate the respective forecasting 
performance of the various institutions.  
 
We find that differences in forecast accuracy are substantial, as the top 10 percent of all 
institutions have a forecast error that is on average 8 basis points smaller than the error made 
by the worst 10 percent of performers. These differences are significant in economic terms, 
both from a financial market perspective and from a policy point of view, reaching a level of 
about one-third of the typical ECB policy rate change of 25 basis points during the sample 
period. 
 
What explains this large heterogeneity in anticipating ECB monetary policy decisions? A first 
result of our empirical analysis is that geography matters for forecast accuracy. There is a 
surprising amount of cross-country variance in expectations about ECB policy rates—
especially in the first years of the sample period. But the pattern of forecast accuracy exceeds 
the concept of nationality. Frankfurt, Germany’s financial centre, also hosts the ECB head-
quarters and the German Bundesbank, one of the ECB’s national member banks and, 
arguably, one of its early role models. As a forecaster, being close to this informational hub 
tends to improve forecast accuracy of analysts working for financial institutions 
headquartered in Frankfurt or running a subsidiary there. The importance of informational 
hubs is corroborated by the good performance of analysts based in London/UK or working for 
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institutions with a subsidiary in the City. As for forecasters working from other locations, 
accuracy tends to be lower with greater geographical distance to Frankfurt.  
A second finding is that national macroeconomic conditions also tend to influence forecast 
accuracy, as the predictions of ECB policies become less precise if the forecaster is located in 
a country where inflation or unemployment rates deviate from the euro area average.  
A third factor driving accuracy seems to be history. Analysts working for institutions 
reporting predominantly from countries with a history of relatively high central bank 
independence tend to make better forecasts of ECB behavior than others.  
Finally, we show that the observed heterogeneity is systematic rather than based on 
differences in “gut feeling” among analysts. To extract the systematic component from 
observed predictions, we estimate bank-specific reaction functions. These Taylor-type rules, 
which tend to be different across institutions, capture a significant part of the underlying 
structure of the published forecast. 
While some of the systematic differences between analysts have been transitional and are, 
thus, indicative of learning, other asymmetries in forecasting performance are more persistent. 
Although some geographical differences in forecasting ability diminish over time, other 
asymmetries prevail or even gain in importance. Splitting the sample into pre-2001 and post-
2001 subperiods, our results show that analysts headquartered in Frankfurt saw their 
performance decline relative to the sample-average. Relative forecast accuracy of financial 
institutions with subsidiaries in Frankfurt became only slightly weaker in the post-2001 
period. In addition, it seems that confusion by forecasters over the importance of national 
relative to euro area macroeconomic conditions for ECB policy decisions was hampering their 
precision of predictions post-2001 more than before.  
 
Our results are reasonably robust across performance measures. In addition to the expected 
level of the ECB policy rate, the data also allow looking at the expected timing of ECB policy 
rate adjustments. We find a broadly similar and stable pattern of forecast accuracy across 
countries and institutions for both types of variables. There is evidence that the factors that 
determine analysts’ expectations of the level of the ECB’s policy rate also influence their 
expectations on the timing of adjustments to this rate. 
 
To our knowledge, the focus on explaining the heterogeneity in monetary policy expectations 
is novel. It relates to earlier literature on the differences in the transmission of the ECB’s 
monetary policy. In the run-up to EMU, several papers asked whether a change in policy rates 
would affect national economies in a heterogeneous fashion, possibly due to differences in 
expectations (Dornbusch et al. 1998; Cecchetti 2001; Mihov 2001). However, results are 
contradictory across studies (Mojon and Peersman 2003). Evidence using data obtained under 
EMU is scarce, for the most part because longer time samples are needed to estimate the full 
transmission path from interest rates to inflation. Accordingly, the few studies available 
analyze only elements of the transmission process (e.g., Angeloni and Ehrmann 2003). No 
study has yet been conducted on the homogeneity of interest rate expectations in the euro 
area, and this is where the present paper attempts to contribute. 
 
In addition, our work is broadly related to the literature on trade in goods and in financial 
assets, as well as the literature on home bias in the allocation of financial portfolios. For 
instance, there is substantial empirical evidence that information asymmetries and information 
frictions are fundamental in explaining trade in goods and financial assets as well as financial 
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investment decisions (e.g. Froot and Stein 1991; Gordon and Bovenberg 1996, Portes, Rey, 
and Oh 2001; Dvorak 2005). Such information asymmetries can take various forms and can 
be related to language, cultural ties, common legal origins, and institutions, among others.2 
As the literature on home bias and capital flows emphasizes, information is also a key factor 
inhibiting “optimal” investment decisions based on portfolio theory. Moreover, location 
decisions by financial firms point toward the importance of information-based agglomeration 
effects. Even though centrifugal factors in the sense of Krugman (1998) exist—for instance, 
the need to be close to locally dispersed customers—and advances in communication 
technology continue to lower transaction costs, centripetal forces seem to matter more in the 
financial services (Tschoegl 2000, Clark 2002, Cook 2004).  
 
In particular, geographic proximity and common socio-cultural attitudes remain key when it 
comes to the realization of information spillovers and economies of scale in information 
processing (Thrift 1994, Grote 2004). Faulconbridge (2003, p. 237) counts “face-to-face 
contact facilitated by social proximity” among the arguments why financial companies 
agglomerate in international financial centers. More generally, Strauss-Kahn and Vives 
(2005) show that firms tend to locate their headquarters preferably in close vicinity to other 
headquarters in the same sector of activity. Another related strand of the literature emphasizes 
that investors are more profitable when investing in firms that are located in geographic 
proximity. For instance, Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001) show that mutual fund managers 
earn significantly more on investments in firms with headquarters located geographically near 
to the mutual fund’s offices. Bae et al. (2005) provide international evidence for a significant 
advantage of local analysts even when controlling for the quality of information provided by 
firms. The present paper suggests that information asymmetries and agglomeration effects 
along these lines might also influence the quality of forecasting of ECB monetary policy. 
 
Our findings have important policy implications. The results indicate that the ECB operates in 
an environment where economic agents have yet to converge on a common expectation-
formation process when it comes to monetary policy. This heterogeneity is systematically 
related do differences in forecasting models, significant in size, and closely related to 
geographic and country-specific factors. That there is only limited evidence of learning 
suggests the presence of persistent informational frictions and asymmetries or agglomeration 
effects in euro area financial markets. Given the importance of expectations for the 
transmission of monetary policy, continued heterogeneity along these lines might prove 
problematic. One implication is that there is room for policies that foster the convergence to a 
common expectation-formation process, for instance through careful and targeted central bank 
communication. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 presents our dataset based on the 
Reuters survey as well as some key stylized facts of these data. The analysis of the 
determinants of differences in forecasting abilities across economic agents, distinguishing 
between geography, country-specific economic conditions and history, is presented in 
Section 3. Section 4 conducts bank-specific Taylor-type rule estimates in order to distinguish 
between the systematic and the unsystematic component of the forecasting errors. Section 5 




                                                 
2 The influence of these factors might exceed the economic realm. For instance, Ginsburgh et al. (2005) discuss 
the case of lack of a common language causing political disenfranchisement among EU citizens. 
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2.  Data and Some Stylized Facts 
 
The data on ECB policy expectations consist of about 4,500 observations. They comprise 
analysts’ forecasts from 11 euro area and 13 other countries polled by Reuters prior to ECB 
Governing Council meetings between January 1999 and January 2005. The panel 
encompasses on average about 30 financial institutions per Governing Council meeting in the 
first years and an average of about 60 institutions toward the end of the sample. Overall, the 
sample contains 120 institutions. The polled financial institutions vary somewhat from 
meeting to meeting, but a core group—comprising most large euro area financial institutions, 
those operating in the City of London, and a few in the US, Australia, and Japan—is 
represented for most meetings. About half the observations are from financial institutions 
with headquarters in euro area countries. 
 
Before each Governing Council meeting, Reuters asked analysts to attach probabilities to 
different scenarios for the ECB’s policy rate (the interest rate paid for the ECB’s main 
refinancing operations facility). For instance, analysts would assign a probability that the ECB 
would increase or decrease the policy rate by 50 or 25 basis points. In addition, the 
questionnaire asked for the analyst’s opinion on the probable timing of the next ECB policy 
change, its direction, and its size. Moreover, there were often (but not always) questions 
regarding the expected interest rate levels at the end of the current and following calendar 
year. Appendix B gives an example of the raw data collected by Reuters. 
 
While the questions changed somewhat over time and not all issues were touched upon before 
every meeting, the data allowed to construct three series that summarize well the expectations 
of institutions and analysts: the expected ECB policy rate (expected rate) for the meeting 
ahead, the policy rate with the highest probability (most likely rate), and the expected speed of 
ECB decision-making as measured by the expected number of meetings until the next change 
in the policy rate (meetings-to-change). 
 
With a few exceptions, each set of forecasts was associated with a reporting financial 
institution and the specific location where the Reuters questionnaire was answered.3 In many 
cases, the reporting location was the institution’s headquarters. If headquarters and reporting 
location diverged, it was often the institution’s subsidiary in Frankfurt or London that 
answered the questionnaire. This information was used to describe the geographic pattern of 
the forecasts. 
 
To help analyze the data on forecasts and location, we collected a real-time data set on 
inflation, annual growth of industrial production, annual growth of M3, consumer confidence 
indicators, and the actual ECB policy rate, spanning the period 1999 to early 2005 and 
covering, where applicable, the euro area and its individual member countries.  
 
What do the data tell us? In a first attempt to gauge forecast accuracy, we compute the 
absolute forecasting errors for our three policy variables, that is, the absolute difference 
between the predicted and the ex-post action of the ECB at a particular Governing Council 
meeting. We find that a first stylized fact is that the ability to anticipate ECB policy decisions 
differs markedly across economic agents. Figure 1 shows the average absolute forecasting 
error by the financial institutions from the most accurate to the least accurate decile. The most 
accurate institutions have an average forecast error of around 2 basis points, while the least 
                                                 
3 We discard all unattributed responses, as well as those of institutions that have participated less than seven 
times in the poll. 
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accurate ones have an average error of more than 10 basis points over the 1999-2005 period. 
Differences of up to 8 basis points are certainly significant in economic terms, both from a 
financial market perspective and from a policy point of view, reaching a level of about one-
third of the typical ECB policy rate change of 25 basis points during the sample period.4 The 
differences in forecasting ability are quite notable compared to the observed average 
forecasting error in the sample of about 6 basis points for the full sample period (see below 
Table 1 (a)). A second stylized fact is that the dispersion in forecast accuracy remained fairly 
constant (and large) over time. The difference between the best and the worst deciles is 
around 12 basis points in the period prior to mid-2001, and around 10 basis points in the post-
2001 period.5 This suggests that there has been little learning and only a modest reduction in 
information asymmetries across economic agents, though we will return below in detail to the 




Table 1 views forecasting performance through the country-lens, that is, we sort reporting 
institutions and their analysts based on the country in which they are headquartered. The table 
reports the absolute forecasting error by year and country, and sample averages across various 
country groups and sub-periods. Also included are tests for bias and efficiency of the 





The country-perspective suggests that geography matters. Looking at average performance 
regarding the expected policy rate (panel (a)), analysts based in some countries did better than 
others: while forecasters based in companies headquartered in Germany and Portugal show 
significantly lower absolute errors than the euro area average, analysts in Austria, France, and 
Ireland show significantly higher errors. Also, as a rule, forecasters working with financial 
institutions located outside the euro area performed less well than euro area analysts. This 
pattern broadly extends to the most likely rate and to meetings-to-change (panels (b) and (c)). 
 
Moreover, accuracy varies over time. Aggregating across countries, forecast accuracy started 
at fairly high overall levels in 1999, decreased sharply in 2000, stabilized in 2001, and 
improved again—albeit not to its starting level—in more recent years. This suggests a 
structural break around early 2001, when the ECB moved from a policy of interest rate hikes 
to lower rates. Indeed, especially non-euro area forecasters improved their performance in the 
downward-part of the interest rate cycle. Another interesting pattern uncovered by Table 1 is 
that, perhaps not unexpectedly, forecasters face particular difficulties correctly predicting 
interest rate changes. In fact, across the sample, the absolute forecasting error in periods of 
changing policy rates is more than four times larger than in calmer periods. Moreover, there is 
some movement in the ranking of forecasting analysts by country, even though a clear pattern 
                                                 
4 Unfortunately, the Reuters poll does not provide comparable data for the U.S., where mostly primary dealers—
a substantially more homogenous group of forecasters, and mostly located in New York—are surveyed prior to 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings. This precludes a direct comparison of ECB results with the 
Fed experience. Furthermore, a principle complication is that the ECB Governing Council meets more frequently 
than the FOMC. 
5 Note that the calculations were performed separately for all three sample periods. Accordingly, the composition 
of the deciles differs, such that the figures for the full sample are not necessarily weighted averages of the two 
subperiods. The sample means are about 5 and 6 basis points, respectively, in the pre- and post 2001 period 
(Table 1(a)). 
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is hard to discern by simple descriptive statistics alone. These results are broadly similar 
across the two forecasted interest rate variables and the variable meetings-to-change. 
 
Despite these differences in forecast accuracy among institutions, generally the forecasts are 
unbiased and efficient. The very last columns in Table 1 provide information on standard tests 
allowing rejection of the hypothesis that the forecasts are biased or inefficient—both for the 
overall sample and, in most cases, by country.6 This is true for the good and the bad 
performers in the sample. For the expected rate, Figure 2 illustrates that the average forecast 
closely tracks the actual (post-meeting) ECB policy rate during most of the period, while 




While there is evidence that forecast performance differs across countries, Table 1 also 
indicates that there is substantially more variation within than across countries. The table 
reports the standard deviation of the mean absolute forecast error across institutions within 
each country. For the expected rate in Table 1a, this standard deviation ranges from 0.06 to 
0.14, with an average of 0.08. Calculating the standard deviation of the average national 
forecast errors leads to a considerably lower figure, which stands at 0.02. This suggests that 
the search for determinants of forecasting performance needs to go beyond the country 
dimension.  
 
The results summarized so far invite further discussion. In what follows, we will attempt to 
decompose the findings along two dimensions.  
 
One dimension pertains to the geographical pattern. This is open to a number of 
interpretations. The good forecasting performance of analysts headquartered in, say, Germany 
could be due to their relative closeness to Frankfurt. Alternatively, it might have to do with 
advantages from informational agglomeration. At the same time, we cannot exclude that 
historical experience with “central bank watching” plays a role.  
Another relates to theory. If analysts based their forecasts of ECB behavior (mostly) on 
economic theory, one would expect that their predictions could, one way or the other, be 
explained by concepts like the Taylor rule. If true, this would allow filtering out the 
unsystematic errors made by analysts—and focusing on the systematic, model-based error 
instead. In addition, it would allow us to learn something about the models applied by 






                                                 
6 The unbiasedness test is based on the following equation: , where r
t
e
tt rr εβα ++= t is the policy rate after the 
Council meeting t and  are the expectations, with the Wald test of the joint hypothesis that Hetr 0: α=0 and β=1. 
Under the efficiency test, expectations are efficient if forecast errors cannot be predicted systematically on the 
basis of past policy decisions rt-p :  , with the lag length chosen as P=6. The efficiency 
hypothesis to be tested is ψ1= ψ2=...= ψP=0. Note that both tests are based on country-specific, rather than 











3.  The Role of Geography, Macro Conditions, and History 
 
To learn more about the pattern underlying the forecasting errors, we move to an econometric 
approach. In the bulk of this section, we focus on the expected policy rate. Toward the end of 
this section, we will also comment on the results for the highest expected rate and meeting-to-
change. 
 
Our main objective is to understand differences in the forecast accuracy (in the sense of a 
lower forecasting error) across financial institutions in anticipating ECB monetary policy 
decisions. Hence we investigate whether the size, or absolute value, of the forecast error 
varies across institutions, and whether this difference can be explained with factors reflecting 
geography, country-specific macroeconomic, and central banking conditions. While the 
directional differences in forecasting errors is not central to the question of accuracy, we will 
shed some light on this issue in Section 4, where we analyze whether differences in 
forecasting performance are related to different weights economic agents give to various 
macroeconomic variables when forming their policy expectations. 
 
 
3.1  Explaining the expected rate 
Since we are interested in overall forecast accuracy, the variable of interest is the absolute 




itit rre −= , 
 
where rt is the policy rate after the Governing Council meeting t and  are analyst i’s 




 ittitit ue +++= γα βy|| ,  
 
where α is a constant, yit is a vector of explanatory variables that are either analyst-specific or 
analyst-and meeting-specific, β is the matching coefficient vector, γt represents meeting-
fixed-effects, and uit is a residual following standard assumptions.7  
 
Including meeting-fixed-effects in the model is a very flexible tool to robustly control for a 
number of potentially influential unobservables. For instance, there might be idiosyncrasies 
regarding the selection of financial institutions or analysts by Reuters or, as already hinted at, 
time-trends in the number of financial institutions polled by Reuters. Moreover, including 
meeting-fixed-effects will help to model any changes in forecasting behavior possibly 
associated with the ECB Council’s change from a bimonthly meetings to monthly meetings in 
late 2001. 
 
To learn more about the pattern underlying the forecasting errors, we define a comprehensive 
set of explanatory variables along the dimensions of geography, macro conditions, and 
history. The variables are described below.8
                                                 
7 Note that we want to explain the difference in the magnitude of the forecasting error made by each forecasting 
institution. Accordingly, the model contains a number of purely institution-varying explanatory variables, which 
precludes the inclusion of an institution-fixed effect. 
8 All “geography” variables are based on the information contained in the Reuters polls. “Macro conditions” are 




Headquarters in Frankfurt: dummy variable; one for all financial institutions 
that file their forecasts of ECB policy rates from 
Frankfurt in the majority of cases, and zero 
otherwise 
Subsidiary in Frankfurt: dummy variable; marks financial institutions that 
report at least once from Frankfurt, but from other 
locations in the majority of cases 
Headquarter or subsidiary in London:  dummy variable; identifies financial institutions 
reporting at least once from London that are not 
already included in the first two categories 
Vicinity: dummy variable; includes financial institutions 
that have not been classified into one of the three 
categories above, but that have their headquarter 
or a subsidiary within 1,000 kilometers from 
Frankfurt 
 
Macro conditions  
Relative inflation: difference between euro area and national HICP 
inflation rates based on information available at 
the time of the Reuters poll regarding meeting t; 
set to zero for all financial institutions that are 
headquartered outside the euro area 
Relative unemployment: equivalent variable for unemployment rates 
 
History  
Central bank independence: dummy variable; 1 if the pre-1999 
Grilli/Masciandaro/Tabellini (1991) index for 
central bank independence for the country in 
which a bank is headquartered is above the 
(unweighted) euro area average; -1 if the index is 
below the euro area average; set to zero for non-
euro area financial institutions 
 
Table 2 presents OLS estimates for the full sample. As a robustness check, and because the 
macro condition variables might not be fully independent from the history variable, model (1) 
shows the results without and model (2) shows the results with “central bank independence” 




The full-sample results show the importance of information and location. Analysts working 
for institutions that are either headquartered in Frankfurt or operate a subsidiary there tend to 
have significantly lower forecasting errors (i.e., higher forecasting errors or better 
                                                                                                                                                        
Grilli/Masciandaro/Tabellini (1991) index for central bank independence. While more recent central bank 
independence indicators are available, the Grilli/Masciandaro/Tabellini (1991) index has the advantage of 
providing information prior to EMU-induced institutional convergence. 
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performance) than others.9 This might be because it is helpful to observe the ECB’s action 
up-close and on an everyday basis or because of informal information spillovers in a financial 
center. Another explanation for the importance of Frankfurt as location might be previous 
experience: to the extent that the ECB’s actions followed similar patters as the Bundesbank 
before 1999, local analysts might have found the human capital they had accumulated 
watching the Bundesbank still helpful after 1999. In addition, financial expertise in general 
and, possibly, positive agglomeration effects with regard to information processing might be 
at work as well. This notion is weakly supported by the negative point-estimate for the 
coefficient of headquarter or subsidiary in London. The coefficient is not significant at 
conventional levels, however. 
 
Macro conditions also matter for forecasting performance. We find that deviations of national 
inflation and unemployment rates from the euro area average have a significant positive effect 
on the absolute forecasting error.10 The coefficient estimate for relative inflation exceeds the 
estimated coefficient for relative unemployment, signaling a greater potential for national 
inflation experiences to influence the precision of forecasters located in a particular euro area 
country.11
 
There are at least two interpretations of these findings. One is that analysts (still) have a 
national perspective. While producing predictions on actions by the euro area’s common 
central bank, forecasters continue to be informed by developments of their respective host 
countries. That is, they are tempted to take real time data at the national level as indicators of 
area-wide developments rather than aggregating properly weighted national data to form an 
opinion on developments in the area as a whole. An alternative explanation would be that 
high values of the relative macro variables are indicative of increased forecasting uncertainty 
in general. It might simply be easier to predict the ECB’s interest rate policy when euro area 
member economies move in sync than otherwise. 
 
It is worthwhile noting that the magnitude of the forecasting errors linked to geographic and 
macro factors is sizeable. For example, financial institutions with their headquarter or a 
subsidiary in Frankfurt show an average forecasting error that is lower by 1 to 1.5 basis points 
than their peers, compared to the 8 basis points difference overall between the best and worst 
forecasters reported in Figure 1. With respect to the macroeconomic variables, a one 
percentage point larger inflation rate differential leads to forecasting errors that are larger by 
half a basis point on average, whereas a one percentage point larger unemployment rate 
differential increases forecasting errors by one tenth of a basis point. Finally, institutional 
history as captured by the central bank independence dummy variable is not significant in the 
full sample. 
 
How do results change over time? The second and third columns of Table 2 report OLS 
estimates with the sample split about halfway to allow separate estimates for the upward- and 
                                                 
9 The headquarters identified by the reporting criterion are not always the chartered headquarters of the 
respective financial institution. However, we can safely assume that the dominant location from which Reuters 
polls are filed corresponds to the location of the section that performs the ECB-watching tasks. More often than 
not, this section will also conduct a substantial fraction of the euro area business of the respective financial 
institution. 
10 The main reason for using the unemployment rates is that industrial production—perhaps a preferable measure 
of economic activity—is available in real time only for the large countries and the euro area aggregate. 
11 Even controlling for the fact that the standard deviation of the national unemployment rates is three times as 
large as the one of national inflation rates, inflation developments appear more important for forecast accuracy 
than changes in unemployment. 
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downward-part of the interest rate cycle. Standard tests indicate that January 2001 is indeed a 
structural breakpoint in the empirical model, suggesting that analysts changed their behavior 
in a systematic fashion. 
 
The importance of geography declines over time. The coefficients estimated for headquarters 
in Frankfurt and subsidiary in Frankfurt tend to be more negative and statistically more 
significant during the pre-2001 sub-period than post-2001. In addition, vicinity to Frankfurt 
shows a significantly negative effect on the forecasting error during the early but not the late 
period. This intertemporal pattern is present in both models (1) and (2) in Table 2. Looking at 
model (2), we also find weak evidence of a negative coefficient for headquarters or 
subsidiary in London during the pre-2001 sub-period that disappears afterwards.12  
 
A plausible explanation for these results could be learning. While location, especially 
closeness to Frankfurt, played a major role in the earlier years, location might have become 
less important as forecasters throughout the euro area got to know the ECB, picked up the 
necessary tools, or adjusted their models in line with the new realities. Of course, learning 
might also have taken a more “passive” or accidental form. For instance, one could imagine 
changes in the macroeconomic framework or, indeed, in the ECB’s policy setup that increase 
the fit of a given forecasting model that underperformed before. Finally, there might also have 
been passive “unlearning” in the sense that some forecasters failed to adjust models which 
performed well pre-2001 to changing circumstances post-2001.13 The evidence we will 
present below in Section 4.3 suggests that both active and passive forms of learning might 
have played a role here.  
 
A second result is that both macro conditions and institutional history matter more in the post-
2001 sub-period. Indeed, closer inspection of Table 2 reveals that the effect of the three 
variables relative inflation, relative unemployment, and central bank independence was 
almost negligible during the pre-2001 sub-period. This suggests that macro conditions and 
institutional history mattered more (or their influence was more visible) once learning had 
eroded most of the accidental advantage of those headquartered in Frankfurt and when the 
macroeconomic performance of the national economies became somewhat more divergent 
over the latter part of the sample.14 With regard to institutional history, forecast accuracy is 
higher for financial institutions reporting from countries with long-standing traditions of 
independent central banking. Note that this result comes from a regression that already 
controls for geographical factors—that is, we are measuring the impact of institutional history 
on a bank’s forecasting quality in addition to being or not being located in Frankfurt, for 
instance. 
 
3.2  Explaining the “most likely rate” and “meetings-to-next-change” 
The results for macro conditions also extend to our second endogenous variable, the most 
likely rate. For both most likely rate and meetings to next change, the findings regarding 
                                                 
12 The London variable plays a more significant role in explaining systematic forecasting errors for meetings-to-
change (see below). 
13 Institutions making an effort to report forecasts from a subsidiary in Frankfurt seem to lose somewhat less of 
their competitive edge than those with headquarters in Frankfurt. This suggests that some “unlearning” might 
have taken the form of the erosion of what could be called accidental advantages of location. In fact, there might 
be a positive selection bias at work: a forecasting institution might only choose to run a subsidiary in Frankfurt 
because (and as long) the closeness to Frankfurt is associated with better forecast accuracy. 
14 See Angeloni and Ehrmann (2004). For instance, in our sample the average of relative inflation triples from 
pre-2001 to post-2001.  
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geography are somewhat weaker.15 A possible explanation for the latter is that our alternative 
indicators of ECB activity are noisier than the expected policy rate. For instance, forecasters 
falling under the subsidiary in Frankfurt category might implicitly coordinate on a (good) 
mean prediction for the ECB’s policy rate, all-the-while disagreeing on the full distribution or 
on the time-path for the next rate change.16 While the explanatory power of geography is 
weaker for these two alternative endogenous variables, institutional history has a larger role 
for both of them. 
 
 
4.   Decomposition of the Forecasting Errors 
 
There is a remarkable (if not puzzling) degree of heterogeneity to forecast errors in the euro 
area’s early years. While we would expect geography and clustering around informational 
hubs not to matter a lot in tightly integrated and efficient financial markets, apparently they 
do. Moreover, even professional forecasters show some degree of confusion about the relative 
importance of national relative to euro area macroeconomic developments. Also close-hand 
experience with independent central banking in the past seems to influence forecast accuracy. 
The question is whether this heterogeneity can be traced to differences in forecasting 
mechanisms? 
 
Economic theory suggests that central banks might follow a monetary policy rule. This could 
be because they have optimally selected a particular rule, for instance one of the Taylor-
variety, from a set of simple rules or because they follow an optimal monetary policy program 
that resembles such a rule. In both cases financial markets have reason to mimic the bank’s 
supposed behavior when formulating forecasting models for policy rates. 
 
4.1  Definitions 
This argument can be used to filter out the systematic error from the observed (or overall) 
errors made by forecasting institutions. Above we defined the observed error eit made by 
forecaster i at (or rather before) meeting t as , with rt
e
itit rre −= t being the post-meeting policy 
rate and  i’s published forecast. The question is how these expectations are formed?  eitr
 
A plausible assumption is that i’s forecast of the policy rate will include a systematic 
component, based on economic theory. In addition, more often than not, the forecast might 
contain an unsystematic component representing the “gut feeling”, i.e. non-tangibles in the 
information set of the forecasting institution’s analytical staff. Alternatively, this residual 







it uˆrˆr += , 
                                                 
15 The tables showing results equivalent to Table 2 above for the most likely rate and meetings-to-change can be 
found in Appendix A1 (Table A1.1) and A2 (Table A2.1), respectively. Note that the point estimates of the 
coefficients of Table A1.1 for most likely rate are not directly comparable to those for expected rate. The 
regressions for the former variable were run with an ordered probit estimator, owing to the discrete nature of the 
most likely rate forecast errors, 
16 The variable meetings-to-change contains a couple of outliers according to which no change in interest rates 
seems to have been expected for an unreasonably long time period. A closer analysis of these cases showed that 
they are most likely due to typos. We cleaned the dataset for such outliers by dropping the upper 5 percent of the 
distribution. No such cleaning was necessary for expected rate and most likely rate.  
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with  representing the systematic and the unsystematic component in i’s forecast. For 
instance, if the forecaster assumed that the ECB set its policy rate in line with a simple linear 













where the ikβˆ  are forecaster-specific coefficients weighting relevant euro area variables, xkt, 
and  summarizes any influence of other factors unrelated to the xituˆ kt. The assumption is that 
the euro area variables are common knowledge. 
 
While we do not directly observe i’s forecasting model, a reasonable first attempt is perhaps 
to approximate its systematic component by a standard backward-looking Taylor-type rule.17 
In the actual application, we use real time information on euro area year-on-year changes in 
consumer prices (HICP), industrial production, M3, and the level of consumer confidence—as 
available at the time of the Reuters poll, i.e. on the Friday prior to meeting t—for the xkt.18 We 
also introduce a forecaster-specific constant and the previous ECB policy rate into the 
regression. Finally, in line with the earlier discussion, we allow the empirical model to 
differentiate between the upward and downward part of the interest rate cycle. Thus, 













1021 1 ββαα , 
 
where αi1, αi2, βi0, and the are coefficients, Dikβ t is a dummy variable that is one during the 
post-2001 period and zero otherwise, and the residuals uit depict the estimated unsystematic 
component in the bank's policy rate. 
 























1021 1 , 
 
where sit stands for the systematic and uit for the unsystematic component in the observed (or 
overall) forecasting error eit. As before, we are mainly interested in the overall size of the 
forecasting error—that is, we look at the absolute value. Moreover, in what follows, we will 
                                                 
17 Implementing a forward-looking model at the forecaster level would be an alternative. From the perspective of 
the practitioners whose behavior we are modeling, however, the difference between a backward- and a forward-
looking model might be moot. For instance, Sauer and Sturm (2003) show that using real time data (as we do in 
the empirical application), especially when including confidence indicators, is the more important step when 
maximizing the “fit” of Taylor-type rules fro the ECB. There is also a well-known certain arbitrariness in 
selecting the instruments in forward-looking specifications of such rules. 
18 The data are taken from Bloomberg. 
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focus on the absolute systematic error of institution i, |sit|, neglecting the unsystematic 
component in its forecasting performance.19  
 
 
4.2   Explaining the Systematic Error for the Expected Rate 
Table 3 provides information about the systematic component of the observed error similar to 
Table 1(a). A first finding is that the geographic country-pattern behind |sit| is fairly similar to 
the observed error discussed in Section 3. For instance, analysts reporting for German banks 
or other financial institutions perform significantly better than the euro area average, while 
their Austrian and French colleagues significantly underperform in Table 3. Moreover, 
variation over time is similar to |eit|—that is, relatively high accuracy at the beginning and the 
end of the sample, but higher average errors in between.20 Finally, the systematic forecasts, 




Following the analysis in the previous section, we proceed by explaining the systematic error 
component through our set of explanatory variables focusing on geography, macro conditions, 




The result emerging from Table 4 is that most of what has been said about the overall (or 
observed) forecasting error in Section 3 extends to the analysis of its Taylor-type rule based 
systematic component. In other words, differences in modeling the ECB’s policy decisions 
underlie the observed differences in forecast accuracy. As with |eit|, we find that |sit| is 
significantly lower for forecasters that reside in the vicinity to Frankfurt, or report from 
headquarters in Frankfurt or a subsidiary in Frankfurt. As before, these effects are stronger in 
quantitative and statistical terms during the pre-2001 sub-period. In fact, the coefficient for 
vicinity to Frankfurt even turns significantly positive during the post-2001 sub-period. At the 
same time, relative inflation, relative unemployment, and central bank independence all 
matter significantly only during the later half of the sample. All in all, the results are very 
close to those reported in Table 2 above. 
 
A similar picture emerges when we take a more general perspective on performance by again 
comparing top and bottom performers. In most cases, the best performers overall identified in 
Section 3.1. are at the same time also the best performers with respect to the systematic 
forecast error, and similarly, the worst performers overall generally show the worst 
performance when it comes to the systematic forecast. This is true for the full sample as well 
as for the pre- and post-2001 subsamples. We conclude that it is indeed the systematic 
component that matters most in the overall forecast accuracy. 
 
                                                 
19 See Section 2 for a discussion of the unbiasedness of the forecasts. Results for the unsystematic error 
component (not reported) very roughly resemble results for the systematic component, except for the time-path 
of the average error level that is more erratic. 
20 Note, however, that the average systematic error is as low (or even lower) toward the end of the period as at 
the beginning.  
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4.3 Dissecting the Taylor-type Rules for the Expected Rate 
With systematic, model-based errors playing such an important role for the overall forecasting 
performance of individual forecasting institutions, the question arises whether anything can be 
said as to how their models of ECB behavior differed? Looking for answers, we will sort 
individual forecasters according to various characteristics suggested by the analysis of 
forecasting errors and estimate group-specific Taylor-type rules.21
 
As a benchmark, Table 5 shows estimates for a pooled Taylor-type rule for the entire sample 
of financial institutions. We report short-run coefficients, as these are more meaningful for 
forecasts of the imminent policy decisions than the long-run coefficients that are typically 
analyzed in the literature on central bank reaction functions. As discussed above, the model 
relates the expected rate to a number of explanatory variables, allowing coefficients to differ 
between the pre-2001 and post-2001 period. The last column includes information on whether 




The results resemble standard estimated central bank reaction functions—that is, as a whole, 
forecasters follow a fairly conventional approach. On the nominal side, expectations for the 
ECB policy rate increase with HICP inflation and the growth rate of M3. The fact that a 
monetary aggregate plays a significant role might reflect the ECB’s two-pillar strategy or, 
more generally, beliefs that money growth is a predictor of inflation in the medium- to long-
term. Indicator qualities for inflationary pressures might also be behind the fact that, on the 
real side, changes in industrial production and the level of consumer confidence are positively 
related to the expected rate. At the same time, the high estimated coefficients for previous 
rate, i.e., the policy rate prevailing before the meeting for which expectations are formed, 
suggest a high degree of interest rate smoothing and as such a rather protracted reaction to 
changes in the other model variables. 
 
There are, however, interesting changes in the estimates over time. Note, first, that analysts 
expected the ECB to react faster to changes in the explanatory variables in the post-2001 
period: the coefficient for previous rate drops (see last column of Table 5, Panel A) in the 
second half of the sample. At the same time, we observe a shift in the relative importance of 
variables: whereas HICP inflation and, to a smaller degree, consumer confidence have gained 
in importance, the relative weight of industrial production has decreased.  
 
The question is whether these trends where shared by all analysts in the Reuters poll. Panel B 
of Table 5 breaks down the results by geography, macroeconomic conditions, and institutional 
history.22 In the last two columns, the table includes information on whether the coefficients 
are significantly different in statistical terms for the two respective groups, separately for the 
                                                 
21 This is the most convenient analytical tool for this purpose. It is worthwhile repeating, however, that the 
decomposition of the overall forecasting error into its systematic and unsystematic part performed in the 
previous section is based on individual, institution-specific Taylor-type rules. 
22 For these estimates, we have defined a dummy variable that classifies an institution into the “high inflation” 
(or “high unemployment”) category if inflation (unemployment) in the country from which it reports is above the 
euro area average. Consistent with the treatment above, institutions reporting from non-euro area countries were 
set to the euro area average, and thus classified into the “low inflation” (“low unemployment”) group.  Our 
grouping with respect to central bank independence is based on the earlier definition of the CBI dummy, 
whereby we classified all institutions reporting from countries where the dummy equals one (i.e, where the 
central bank independence index is above the euro area average) into the “high central bank independence” 
category. 
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two periods. As these estimates are based on about 120 observations (one per financial 
institution), which are furthermore split into two not necessarily equally large groups, the 
power of any statistical testing has to remain limited. This caveat notwithstanding, interesting 
results emerge: 
 
First, the time variations observed for the full set of financial institutions apply equally to 
each subset, with only slight differences with respect to the statistical significance in these 
variations. The importance attached to HICP increases over time for all groups, as does the 
role of consumer confidence. Also the drop in coefficients for industrial production and the 
previous interest rate is shared by all groups.  
Second, looking at the differences across groups, the point estimates of the coefficients 
suggest that financial institutions positioned in Frankfurt have given greater weight to 
inflation but lower weight to money growth than institutions operating outside Frankfurt. 
However, these differences, as well as most other between-group differences, are not 
significant, perhaps owing to the low statistical power of the tests.  
 
 
4.4   Do These Results Extend to Other Measures of Systematic Expectations? 
In principle, the tools developed to decompose the observed forecasting error into its 
systematic and unsystematic component can be used for our alternative independent variables 
as well. The application to most likely rate is straightforward. Regarding meetings-to-change, 
we estimate separate Taylor-type rules for times of expected policy rate increases and 
decreases.23 Detailed results for both exercises are reported in Appendices A1 and A2. 
 
 
Most Likely Rate 
 
Turning to the results for most likely rate first, we find the behavior of the systematic forecast 
error fairly similar to the expected rate variable. The country-by-country perspective (Table 
A1.2) identifies the same regions as significant under- and over-performers as Table 3 for 
expected rate, and the regression results (Table A1.3) indicate that the geographic, 
macroeconomic, and historical patterns underlying these results are comparable for both 
independent variables. Interestingly, however, the explanatory variable headquarter or 
subsidiary in London, which was estimated negative but insignificant for the expected rate 
(see Table 4), comes out negative and significant for most likely rate.  
 
The intertemporal pattern of learning, change, and persistence behind the systematic 
forecasting error for most likely rate is not very different from the one found for expected 
rate. Splitting the sample into a pre-2001 and a post-2001 sub-period (Table A1.3), produces 
results akin to Table 4 above. Again we find that relative inflation, relative unemployment, 
and central bank independence have a significant impact on the forecasting error only during 
                                                 
23 The interpretation of the meetings-to-change variable depends on the expected direction of monetary policy. If 
markets expect a policy rate hike, higher inflation figures then imply that the next action should come sooner 
rather than later. The opposite holds when a drop in the policy rate is expected: with higher inflation, the next cut 
in policy rates should come later rather than sooner. Accordingly, the coefficients in the Taylor-type rule should 
flip signs depending on the expected direction of the next change in policy rates. By estimating Taylor-rules 
conditional on the expected direction of monetary policy, we can capture this feature of the independent variable. 
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the later half of the sample, while the significant effects of most geographic variables 
disappear post-2001.24  
 
These similarities are also reflected in the estimated Taylor-type rule coefficients for the most 





The variable meetings-to-change can be adequately modeled by a Taylor-type rule as well. 
And while the distribution of systematic meetings-to-change forecast errors across countries 
differs from the one found for the expected rate and most likely rate, the underlying 
geographic, macroeconomic, and historical pattern tends to be broadly in line with previous 
findings. For instance, forecasters headquartered in Germany do not perform better than the 
average forecaster in the sample, while those working from the United Kingdom outperform 
their peers (Table A2.2). Nonetheless, the regression-based analysis reveals a number of 
similarities with the results reported above (Tables A2.3): while we cannot detect a significant 
role for macroeconomic conditions, we find that geography and institutional history matters in 
the same way as for expected rate or most likely rate. Interestingly, we find that headquarter 
or subsidiary in London plays a more significant role than for expected rate or most likely 
rate. 
 
Learning plays a remarkably large role in explaining the systematic errors for meetings-to-
change (Table A2.3). Being located in either Frankfurt or London tends to significantly 
reduce forecasting errors pre-2001, but none of the geography variables matters during the 
post-2001 sub-period. Moreover, the history of central bank independence is associated with 
better forecasting performance only post-2001. 
 
Turning to the underlying Taylor-type rules, we find that, although not comparable 
quantitatively, the rules are qualitatively very similar to those estimated with the other 
forecast variables (Table A2.4).25 All coefficients in the Taylor-type rule based on the full 
panel are estimated to be significant, and they have the expected sign (panel A). In the 
presence of rate hike expectations, higher inflation rates lead the forecasters to expect an 
interest rate hike sooner (as indicated through a negative coefficient, and thus fewer meetings 
before the next change). The same applies for larger figures for M3, industrial production and 
consumer confidence. If the current interest rates are high under rate hike expectations, the 
urge to increase them further diminishes, as shown by the positive coefficients. The changes 
over time replicate those found for the other two forecasts, with the exception of inflation, 
which has become less prominent in this variant. This change in behavior is rather uniform 






                                                 
24 In contrast to the expected rate model, the coefficient for headquarters in Frankfurt is shown as increasing in 
column (1) post-2001 compared to pre-2001. Results are similar, however, when central bank independence is 
included—see column (2) in Table A1.3. 
25 Note that the coefficients shown are averaged over periods of expected policy rate increases and decreases. 
Coefficients for periods of policy rate declines have been multiplied by (–l) to ensure compatibility. 
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5.  Conclusions 
 
EMU has implied the assignment of monetary policy making for 12 countries with varying 
histories of inflation, policy strategies, and economic environments to the ECB. Monetary 
policy is now conducted taking a euro area-wide perspective, but operates in a multi-country, 
multi-cultural and multi-lingual context. This raises a number of issues: How does this 
heterogeneity of conditions and backgrounds in member countries affect the ability of 
economic agents to understand and anticipate monetary policy by the ECB? Is there 
convergence in the views how the ECB conducts monetary policy? Or are the differences in 
the ability to anticipate the ECB’s decisions indicative of more permanent information 
asymmetries related to geographic proximity and country-specific factors? 
 
Using a novel database on the forecasts of ECB policy decisions of 120 financial institutions 
in 24 countries since 1999, we find some marked differences in the ability of economic agents 
to understand and anticipate policy decisions by the ECB. The paper shows that a substantial 
part of these differences is persistent and systematically explained by geography, country-
specific economic conditions, and history. We find that financial institutions that are based in 
Frankfurt, or have a subsidiary in Frankfurt, perform substantially better in predicting ECB 
policy decisions. Some informational advantage also appears to be at play for institutions 
based in the City of London. Furthermore, distance matters, as institutions that are located 
more closely to Frankfurt also show better forecasting performance. This suggests that 
information asymmetries and agglomeration effects play a role in the ability of economic 
agents to anticipate monetary policy in the euro area. This finding is in line with earlier 
literature that analyses the reasons for the existence of international financial centers, which 
argues that face-to-face contacts among financial market actors are facilitated by proximity, 
and are an essential factor in knowledge production and thus performance.  
 
Country-specific economic conditions and histories also are relevant. Financial analysts are 
better at predicting ECB behavior when they are located in countries that have low levels of 
inflation and/or unemployment relative to the (weighted) euro area average. Moreover, 
financial institutions in countries with a history of relatively high central bank independence 
tend to make better forecasts of ECB behavior than others. Finally, we find that most of the 
heterogeneity in forecasting performance can be related to different models of ECB behavior 
and there is little evidence of learning. 
 
Our results have important policy implications. Expectations are a crucial factor in the 
transmission of monetary policy. And a central bank operating in a heterogeneous 
environment such as the ECB needs to be aware of differences in the ability of economic 
agents to understand and anticipate monetary policy—differences that appear to be significant 
in the case of the euro area. To a small degree this heterogeneity is transitory and, therefore, 
not a cause of great concern. However, a substantial part of it appears to persist. Euro area 
financial markets have yet to converge on a homogeneous view of the ECB, to overcome 
locational and national biases, and to adopt a common expectation-formation process. 
Although some informational frictions and asymmetries or agglomeration effects may be a 
permanent feature of financial activity in any region, there seems to be scope for continuous 
guidance of this convergence process by a careful and targeted communication policy of the 
central bank.  
 
There are multiple avenues for further research. A first extension would be to explore likely 
links between ECB communication and expectations on ECB policy. For instance, it could be 
asked whether communication in the form of speeches or interviews, perhaps targeted at 
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particular audiences within EMU, is helpful in reducing systematic heterogeneity of 
expectations. A related question is whether certain forms of ECB communication are more 
likely to focus the attention of regional audiences than others. A second area for future 
research is to apply the framework for identifying and explaining systematic heterogeneity in 
expectations to other central banks, such as the U.S. Federal Reserve, in order to understand 
whether geography plays a central role for the formation of monetary policy expectations also 
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Table 1 (a): Absolute error for expected rate by country (in %) 
 
 
pre- post- unbiased- efficiency
change no change ness test test
# obs mean diff. st. dev. 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 1999-2005 1999-2005 p-value p-value
Austria 90 0.087 *** 0.098 0.000 0.096 0.150 0.105 0.089 0.049 0.038 0.125 0.083 0.050 0.095 0.000 0.000
Belgium 8 0.100 0.139 -- -- -- 0.063 0.130 0.025 -- 0.188 0.048 -- 0.100 0.981 --
Denmark 147 0.053 0.081 0.000 0.076 0.091 0.057 0.045 0.009 0.013 0.211 0.030 0.043 0.062 0.156 0.895
Finland 98 0.060 0.081 0.000 0.094 0.068 0.062 0.085 0.012 0.006 0.188 0.039 0.066 0.057 0.612 0.508
France 314 0.070 ** 0.083 0.000 0.089 0.117 0.090 0.080 0.033 0.027 0.169 0.058 0.049 0.078 0.000 0.000
United Kingdom 1,426 0.062 0.075 0.011 0.090 0.092 0.070 0.064 0.028 0.008 0.177 0.046 0.060 0.064 0.000 0.000
Germany 1,290 0.053 *** 0.075 0.003 0.068 0.084 0.068 0.055 0.025 0.007 0.182 0.035 0.040 0.060 0.000 0.000
Ireland 72 0.073 ** 0.060 0.000 0.089 0.101 0.060 0.056 0.006 0.000 0.148 0.061 0.073 0.073 0.170 0.280
Italy 150 0.046 0.085 0.000 0.079 0.046 0.062 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.195 0.026 0.056 0.036 0.050 0.136
Netherlands 119 0.066 0.077 0.000 0.090 0.064 0.081 0.058 0.054 0.013 0.177 0.053 0.070 0.064 0.220 0.551
Portugal 118 0.042 *** 0.071 0.000 0.057 0.089 0.028 0.027 0.006 0.000 0.175 0.025 0.043 0.041 0.023 0.000
Sweden 71 0.063 0.060 0.000 0.079 0.071 0.082 0.075 0.031 0.000 0.156 0.054 0.063 0.063 0.520 0.941
USA 96 0.063 0.089 0.023 0.103 0.063 0.044 0.071 0.071 -- 0.216 0.041 0.064 0.062 0.046 0.296
Others 243 0.069 ** 0.073 0.000 0.107 0.083 0.090 0.063 0.032 0.013 0.178 0.054 0.070 0.069 0.029 0.675
Euro area 2,350 0.057 0.078 0.002 0.076 0.085 0.071 0.061 0.027 0.013 0.179 0.041 0.047 0.063 0.000 0.000
Non-euro area 1,892 0.062 * 0.076 0.009 0.090 0.089 0.070 0.065 0.028 0.008 0.180 0.046 0.058 0.064 0.000 0.000






Notes: -- indicates missing values; "diff." shows significance level of a t-test of whether the country-specific mean is different from the mean for all countries. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively. The unbiasedness test and efficiency test are as defined in the text; p-values of above 0.90 indicate that 






Table 1 (b): Absolute error for most likely rate by country (in %) 
 
 
pre- post- unbiased- efficiency
change no change ness test test
# obs mean diff. st. dev. 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 1999-2005 1999-2005 p-value p-value
Austria 105 0.067 *** 0.121 0.000 0.018 0.115 0.078 0.088 0.039 0.000 0.111 0.063 0.010 0.085 0.000 0.001
Belgium 8 0.094 0.186 -- -- -- 0.000 0.150 0.000 -- 0.250 0.000 -- 0.094 0.920 --
Denmark 149 0.040 0.097 0.000 0.060 0.076 0.038 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.197 0.017 0.034 0.047 0.111 0.999
Finland 111 0.034 0.086 0.000 0.066 0.054 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.167 0.013 0.046 0.030 0.743 0.490
France 357 0.043 0.105 0.000 0.065 0.083 0.036 0.042 0.000 0.000 0.165 0.028 0.042 0.044 0.000 0.007
United Kingdom 1,442 0.036 0.092 0.012 0.073 0.058 0.017 0.030 0.001 0.000 0.173 0.016 0.049 0.030 0.064 0.000
Germany 1,299 0.030 *** 0.084 0.003 0.052 0.048 0.020 0.030 0.001 0.000 0.175 0.010 0.031 0.029 0.846 0.018
Ireland 61 0.049 0.100 -- 0.036 0.076 0.083 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.150 0.029 0.034 0.058 0.699 0.426
Italy 133 0.036 0.098 0.000 0.060 0.030 0.068 0.000 0.000 -- 0.162 0.017 0.040 0.030 0.052 0.164
Netherlands 124 0.026 0.077 0.000 0.068 0.022 0.023 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.188 0.009 0.052 0.018 0.494 0.059
Portugal 130 0.027 0.078 0.000 0.039 0.051 0.016 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.161 0.011 0.028 0.026 0.027 0.000
Sweden 74 0.030 0.082 0.000 0.044 0.054 0.000 0.025 0.029 0.000 0.107 0.022 0.033 0.029 0.189 0.983
USA 73 0.051 0.125 0.050 0.075 0.034 0.033 0.058 0.094 -- 0.250 0.023 0.056 0.050 0.212 0.260
Others 248 0.033 0.088 0.000 0.065 0.037 0.046 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.161 0.017 0.039 0.030 0.494 0.059
Euro area 2,421 0.034 0.091 0.002 0.055 0.054 0.027 0.035 0.003 0.000 0.170 0.016 0.035 0.034 0.000 0.000
Non-euro area 1,893 0.037 0.093 0.010 0.068 0.057 0.020 0.032 0.005 0.000 0.174 0.017 0.045 0.033 0.006 0.000






Notes: -- indicates missing values; "diff." shows significance level of a t-test of whether the country-specific mean is different from the mean for all countries. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively. The unbiasedness test and efficiency test are as defined in the text; p-values of above 0.90 indicate that 






Table 1 (c): Absolute error for meetings-to-change by country (in number of meetings) 
 
 
pre- post- unbiased- efficiency
change no change ness test test
# obs mean diff. st. dev. 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 1999-2005 1999-2005 p-value p-value
Austria 49 5.72 6.078 -- 4.79 0.75 3.00 9.18 10.90 -- 1.33 5.99 4.11 6.32 0.000 0.000
Belgium 0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Denmark 112 4.72 * 4.894 6.73 4.55 1.19 3.69 8.10 9.50 3.00 1.88 5.10 4.87 4.65 0.003 0.000
Finland 83 5.01 5.657 1.50 1.48 3.47 8.12 9.22 4.50 1.75 5.45 1.50 5.09 0.001 0.000
France 264 5.64 5.656 6.86 3.41 2.40 3.44 9.95 11.09 4.75 2.34 6.07 4.33 6.30 0.000 0.000
United Kingdom 1113 5.59 6.031 6.04 3.48 2.60 3.85 10.56 9.22 4.24 2.05 6.11 4.01 6.17 0.000 0.000
Germany 887 5.18 5.536 6.20 3.14 1.97 3.33 9.97 10.01 3.30 2.01 5.64 4.08 5.70 0.000 0.000
Ireland 56 4.04 ** 4.377 -- 4.05 2.52 3.67 5.00 8.83 2.00 1.88 4.40 4.35 3.86 0.001 0.000
Italy 101 4.03 *** 4.301 6.21 3.70 1.84 2.20 8.22 7.09 -- 1.75 4.39 3.90 4.15 0.077 0.000
Netherlands 111 5.93 5.235 8.25 3.79 2.74 3.50 10.47 10.57 4.00 1.36 6.42 5.07 6.13 0.001 0.000
Portugal 121 6.17 ** 6.298 9.88 3.52 2.31 3.67 13.60 11.68 6.50 1.71 6.65 4.14 7.05 0.000 0.000
Sweden 42 6.44 6.113 8.75 4.56 3.64 3.11 12.20 9.40 8.00 4.80 6.66 5.09 6.92 0.000 0.000
USA 63 4.92 6.393 7.50 4.36 2.06 3.81 11.50 17.00 -- 2.25 5.39 4.69 4.99 0.000 0.000
Others 197 5.65 6.414 8.50 2.98 2.06 3.11 12.61 9.83 1.00 2.07 6.08 4.06 6.36 0.000 0.000
Euro area 1,754 5.31 5.621 6.48 3.40 2.05 3.35 10.05 10.23 3.82 1.95 5.76 4.12 5.82 0.000 0.000
Non-euro area 1,445 5.51 5.951 6.54 3.55 2.45 3.73 10.64 9.29 4.25 2.14 5.99 4.19 6.03 0.000 0.000
All countries 3,199 5.40 5.773 6.51 3.47 2.23 3.53 10.32 9.79 4.02 2.04 5.86 4.15 5.92 0.000 0.000




Notes: -- indicates missing values; "diff." shows significance level of a t-test of whether the country-specific mean is different from the mean for all countries. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively. The unbiasedness test and efficiency test are as defined in the text; p-values of above 0.90 indicate that 




Table 2: Explaining the forecast error: geography, macro conditions and history 
 
coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err.
Distance:
Headquarters in Frankfurt -0.011 *** 0.003 -0.017 *** 0.005 -0.007 * 0.004 -0.009 *** 0.003 -0.016 *** 0.005 -0.004 0.004
Subsidiary in Frankfurt -0.015 *** 0.003 -0.017 *** 0.005 -0.015 *** 0.004 -0.014 *** 0.003 -0.016 *** 0.006 -0.012 *** 0.004
HQ or Subsidiary in London -0.002 0.003 -0.007 0.005 0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.007 * 0.005 0.002 0.003
Vicinity to Frankfurt -0.001 0.003 -0.012 ** 0.005 0.003 0.004 -0.001 0.003 -0.013 *** 0.005 0.005 0.004
Macro conditions:
Relative inflation 0.005 *** 0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.008 *** 0.002 0.006 *** 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.010 *** 0.002
Relative unemployment 0.001 ** 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002 *** 0.001 0.001 ** 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.003 *** 0.001
History:
Central bank independence -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.004 ** 0.002
# observations 4242 1414 2828 4242 1414 2828
full period full period
(1) (2)
pre-2001 post-2001 pre-2001 post-2001
 
 









# obs mean diff. st. dev. 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 1999-2005 1999-2005
Austria 90 0.107 *** 0.094 0.029 0.132 0.114 0.153 0.139 0.061 0.009 0.219 0.094 0.079 0.113
Belgium 8 0.135 * 0.140 -- -- -- 0.125 0.162 0.023 -- 0.245 0.069 -- 0.135
Denmark 147 0.066 0.089 0.020 0.091 0.083 0.092 0.093 0.014 0.011 0.270 0.037 0.061 0.071
Finland 98 0.077 0.092 0.016 0.114 0.090 0.065 0.114 0.020 0.046 0.238 0.051 0.086 0.074
France 314 0.085 *** 0.081 0.023 0.115 0.109 0.116 0.117 0.037 0.036 0.243 0.067 0.076 0.089
United Kingdom 1,426 0.074 0.084 0.028 0.111 0.084 0.076 0.108 0.027 0.018 0.237 0.051 0.078 0.072
Germany 1,290 0.069 ** 0.088 0.024 0.095 0.075 0.098 0.097 0.023 0.020 0.261 0.043 0.063 0.072
Ireland 72 0.070 0.071 0.014 0.102 0.073 0.056 0.064 0.029 0.018 0.186 0.051 0.087 0.062
Italy 150 0.067 0.086 0.024 0.098 0.052 0.072 0.110 0.025 0.012 0.252 0.041 0.075 0.058
Netherlands 119 0.071 0.090 0.029 0.114 0.060 0.085 0.092 0.025 0.015 0.275 0.048 0.092 0.065
Portugal 118 0.069 0.086 0.031 0.107 0.076 0.087 0.078 0.016 0.009 0.268 0.044 0.084 0.062
Sweden 71 0.065 0.074 0.016 0.078 0.065 0.090 0.076 0.036 0.013 0.219 0.051 0.064 0.065
USA 96 0.060 0.090 0.029 0.089 0.056 0.047 0.084 0.058 -- 0.216 0.038 0.058 0.061
Others 243 0.078 0.084 0.044 0.113 0.070 0.090 0.108 0.029 0.018 0.240 0.055 0.086 0.072
Euro area 2,350 0.073 0.087 0.025 0.101 0.077 0.097 0.103 0.027 0.023 0.254 0.050 0.071 0.075
Non-euro area 1,892 0.072 0.084 0.027 0.107 0.081 0.077 0.104 0.027 0.017 0.237 0.049 0.075 0.071






Notes: -- indicates missing values; "diff." shows significance level of a t-test of whether the country-specific mean is different from the mean for all countries. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively. 
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coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err.
Distance:
Headquarters in Frankfurt -0.008 *** 0.002 -0.011 *** 0.004 -0.006 * 0.003 -0.006 *** 0.003 -0.012 *** 0.004 -0.001 0.003
Subsidiary in Frankfurt -0.010 *** 0.002 -0.011 ** 0.004 -0.010 *** 0.003 -0.009 *** 0.003 -0.011 *** 0.004 -0.007 ** 0.003
HQ or Subsidiary in London -0.001 0.002 -0.004 0.004 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.005 0.004 0.002 0.002
Vicinity to Frankfurt 0.000 0.002 -0.009 ** 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.002 -0.009 ** 0.004 0.005 ** 0.003
Macro conditions:
Relative inflation 0.005 *** 0.001 -0.163 0.002 0.855 *** 0.001 0.006 *** 0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.011 *** 0.002
Relative unemployment 0.001 *** 0.000 -0.010 0.001 0.247 *** 0.001 0.002 *** 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 *** 0.001
History:
Central bank independence -0.002 * 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.004 *** 0.001
# observations 4242 1414 2828 4242 1414 2828
full period full period
(1) (2)
pre-2001 post-2001 pre-2001 post-2001
 
Table 4: Explaining the Taylor-type rule systematic error: geography, macro conditions and history across sub-periods 







Table 5: Taylor-type rule estimates 
 




coef. std. err. coef. std. err. 2001A
HICP inflation 3.651 *** 1.112 6.184 *** 0.562 Y
M3 2.556 *** 0.527 3.467 *** 0.287
Industrial production 1.761 *** 0.172 0.606 *** 0.094 Y
Consumer confidence 0.001 0.001 0.032 *** 0.001 Y




(B)  By group 
pre-2001 post-2001 pre- pre-2001 post-2001 pre-
vs. vs.
post- post- pre- post-
coef. coef. 2001A coef. coef. 2001A 2001B 2001C
Vicinity
HICP inflation 3.595 *** 6.147 *** Y 3.410 6.659 ***
M3 2.825 *** 3.509 *** 2.331 ** 3.313 ***
Industrial production 1.786 *** 0.579 *** Y 1.536 *** 0.667 *** Y
Consumer confidence 0.001 0.032 *** Y -0.001 0.030 *** Y
Previous rate 0.948 *** 0.824 *** Y 0.954 *** 0.834 *** Y
Macro conditions
HICP inflation 5.096 * 4.050 *** 3.503 *** 6.500 *** Y
M3 3.885 *** 2.581 *** 2.362 *** 3.605 *** Y
Industrial production 1.717 *** 0.580 ** Y 1.741 *** 0.589 *** Y
Consumer confidence 0.003 0.027 *** Y 0.000 0.032 *** Y Y
Previous rate 0.933 *** 0.860 *** Y 0.951 *** 0.822 *** Y Y
Macro conditions
HICP inflation 1.907 5.705 *** Y 5.065 *** 6.557 ***
M3 2.296 *** 3.562 *** 3.034 *** 3.381 ***
Industrial production 1.750 *** 0.725 *** Y 1.701 *** 0.511 *** Y
Consumer confidence 0.000 0.031 *** Y 0.001 0.032 *** Y
Previous rate 0.960 *** 0.830 *** Y 0.940 *** 0.825 *** Y
History
HICP inflation 4.919 *** 5.730 *** 1.573 7.002 *** Y
M3 3.412 *** 3.268 *** 1.566 * 3.824 *** Y
Industrial production 1.684 *** 0.494 *** Y 1.796 *** 0.806 *** Y
Consumer confidence 0.000 0.032 *** Y 0.001 0.031 *** Y
Previous rate 0.941 *** 0.826 *** Y 0.961 *** 0.828 *** Y
high inflation low inflation
low CB independence high CB independence
high unemployment low unemployment
outside Frankfurt HQ or subsidiary in Frankfurt
comparison
 
Notes:  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% level, respectively. 
A Y indicates rejection at the 90% level of a t-test of equality of the pre-2001 and post-2001 coefficients. 
B  Y indicates rejection at the 90% level of a t-test of equality of the coefficients of the two groups pre-2001. 
C  Y  indicates rejection at the 90% level of a t-test of equality of the coefficients of the two groups post-2001. 
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Note: The figure shows the average absolute forecast error in basis points by financial institutions, ranging from 
those 10% of institutions with the lowest forecast errors in decile 1 to those 10% with the highest error in decile 
10. The fact that the average errors for the full sample period can be (somewhat) larger or smaller than for both 
subperiods is owed to the fact that the allocation of institutions to deciles changes slightly over time. 
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Source: Reuters; own calculations. 
Note: The figure shows the mean as well as the minimum and maximum of the policy rate forecasts polled by 
Reuters before a particular ECB Council meeting. In addition, the actual policy rate as decided in the respective 
meeting is depicted. 
 
 
Appendix A: Results for most likely rate and meetings-to-change 
 
 
Table A1.1: Most likely rate. Explaining the forecast error: geography, macro conditions and history 
 
coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err.
Distance:
Headquarters in Frankfurt -0.252 * 0.141 -0.143 0.256 -0.298 * 0.172 -0.102 0.154 -0.073 0.271 -0.055 0.191
Subsidiary in Frankfurt -0.264 * 0.151 -0.345 0.280 -0.213 0.182 -0.156 0.158 -0.294 0.287 -0.039 0.192
HQ or Subsidiary in London -0.130 0.114 0.088 0.214 -0.227 0.138 -0.100 0.115 0.092 0.214 -0.171 0.140
Vicinity to Frankfurt 0.045 0.122 -0.192 0.234 0.081 0.148 0.089 0.124 -0.198 0.234 0.174 0.153
Macro conditions:
Relative inflation 0.197 *** 0.066 0.060 0.129 0.287 *** 0.081 0.231 *** 0.067 0.081 0.131 0.344 *** 0.083
Relative unemployment 0.048 ** 0.020 0.021 0.033 0.094 *** 0.028 0.057 *** 0.021 0.020 0.033 0.112 *** 0.029
History:
Central bank independence -0.135 ** 0.054 -0.081 0.099 -0.205 *** 0.066
# observations 4314 1507 2807 4314 1507 2807
(1) (2)
pre-2001 post-2001full period pre-2001 post-2001 full period
 
 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively. Note that the results in this table stem from an ordered probit estimation as the absolute 
forecast errors of the most likely rate take discrete values of 0 bp, 25 bp, or 50 bp. 
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# obs mean diff. st. dev. 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 1999-2005 1999-2005
Austria 105 0.095 *** 0.103 0.012 0.089 0.091 0.143 0.148 0.053 0.019 0.240 0.082 0.065 0.105
Belgium 8 0.133 * 0.179 -- -- -- 0.047 0.184 0.046 -- 0.296 0.034 -- 0.133
Denmark 149 0.064 0.092 0.018 0.087 0.084 0.089 0.085 0.010 0.000 0.269 0.034 0.059 0.069
Finland 111 0.072 0.095 0.011 0.112 0.082 0.069 0.094 0.022 0.040 0.250 0.044 0.082 0.068
France 357 0.078 ** 0.087 0.021 0.103 0.089 0.118 0.100 0.025 0.034 0.255 0.055 0.077 0.079
United Kingdom 1,442 0.069 0.090 0.026 0.105 0.075 0.069 0.100 0.023 0.025 0.250 0.043 0.076 0.066
Germany 1,299 0.064 ** 0.092 0.020 0.087 0.064 0.089 0.091 0.021 0.023 0.274 0.035 0.059 0.066
Ireland 61 0.074 0.078 -- 0.104 0.064 0.136 0.039 0.028 0.010 0.174 0.055 0.102 0.058
Italy 133 0.076 0.086 0.025 0.103 0.064 0.076 0.121 0.033 -- 0.253 0.050 0.080 0.069
Netherlands 124 0.054 0.101 0.022 0.101 0.049 0.057 0.064 0.010 0.017 0.316 0.026 0.082 0.046
Portugal 130 0.063 0.084 0.027 0.096 0.056 0.080 0.083 0.017 0.014 0.262 0.039 0.076 0.056
Sweden 74 0.063 0.076 0.031 0.066 0.073 0.085 0.057 0.043 0.016 0.232 0.045 0.054 0.066
USA 73 0.064 0.100 0.045 0.082 0.054 0.056 0.080 0.072 -- 0.233 0.040 0.061 0.065
Others 248 0.070 0.088 0.041 0.106 0.058 0.087 0.088 0.031 0.030 0.261 0.046 0.079 0.064
Euro area 2,421 0.068 0.092 0.021 0.094 0.067 0.090 0.096 0.024 0.025 0.267 0.042 0.068 0.068
Non-euro area 1,893 0.068 0.089 0.027 0.101 0.074 0.072 0.095 0.025 0.023 0.249 0.043 0.073 0.066






Notes: -- indicates missing values; "diff." shows significance level of a t-test of whether the country-specific mean is different from the mean for all countries. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively.
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coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err.
Distance:
Headquarters in Frankfurt -0.013 *** 0.003 -0.012 ** 0.005 -0.013 *** 0.004 -0.010 *** 0.003 -0.013 ** 0.005 -0.005 0.004
Subsidiary in Frankfurt -0.011 *** 0.003 -0.013 ** 0.005 -0.010 ** 0.004 -0.009 *** 0.003 -0.014 ** 0.005 -0.004 0.004
HQ or Subsidiary in London -0.005 ** 0.002 -0.006 0.005 -0.004 0.003 -0.005 * 0.002 -0.006 0.005 -0.002 0.003
Vicinity to Frankfurt -0.002 0.003 -0.013 *** 0.005 0.005 0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.013 *** 0.005 0.008 ** 0.003
Macro conditions:
Relative inflation 0.007 *** 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.009 *** 0.002 0.008 *** 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.012 *** 0.002
Relative unemployment 0.001 * 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 * 0.001 0.001 ** 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 *** 0.001
History:
Central bank independence -0.003 *** 0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.007 *** 0.001
# observations 4314 1507 2807 4314 1507 2807
(1) (2)
full period pre-2001 post-2001 full period pre-2001 post-2001
 










coef. std. err. coef. std. err. 2001A
HICP inflation 2.608 * 1.414 4.082 *** 0.765
M3 2.466 *** 0.685 2.839 *** 0.391
Industrial production 1.266 *** 0.221 0.740 *** 0.127 Y
Consumer confidence 0.002 * 0.001 0.028 *** 0.001 Y
Previous rate 0.956 *** 0.011 0.852 *** 0.006 Y
pre-2001 post-2001
 
Table A1.4: Most likely rate. Taylor-type rule estimates 
 
(A)  All groups 
 
 
(B) By group 
pre-2001 post-2001 pre- pre-2001 post-2001 pre-
vs. vs.
post- post- pre- post-
coef. coef. 2001A coef. coef. 2001A 2001B 2001C
Vicinity
HICP inflation 2.216 3.992 ***
M3 2.843 *** 3.038 ***
Industrial pr * 1.292 *** 0.639 **
Consumer * Y 0.000 0.023 *** Y Y
Previous ra * Y 0.949 *** 0.872 *** Y Y
Macro condi
HICP inflat 2.741 * 3.820 ***
M3 2.348 *** 3.030 ***
Industrial pr 1.218 *** 0.773 ***
Consumer * Y 0.001 0.029 *** Y
Previous ra * Y 0.958 *** 0.848 *** Y
Macro condi
HICP inflat 3.703 ** 3.900 ***
M3 * 3.284 *** 2.883 ***
Industrial pr * 1.089 *** 0.685 ***
Consumer * Y 0.003 0.029 *** Y




oduction 1.206 *** 0.767 **
 confidence 0.003 * 0.030 **
te 0.960 *** 0.843 **
tions
ion 2.946 4.719 **
3.245 * 1.788 *
oduction 1.396 ** 0.561 *
 confidence 0.006 * 0.024 **
te 0.941 *** 0.870 **
tions
ion 1.576 4.350 *
1.809 * 2.749 **
oduction 1.423 *** 0.811 **
 confidence 0.001 0.027 **
te 0.958 *** 0.853 **
y
HICP inflat * 1.649 5.146 ***
M3 * 1.101 2.845 ***
Industrial pr * 1.498 *** 0.778 *** Y
Consumer * Y 0.002 0.026 *** Y
Previous ra * Y 0.955 *** 0.860 *** Y
comparison
outside Frankfurt HQ or subsidiary in Frankfurt
ence high CB independence
low inflation
t low unemployment
ion 3.435 ** 3.529 **
3.422 *** 2.857 **
oduction 1.109 *** 0.720 **
 confidence 0.002 0.030 **





Notes:  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% level, respectively. 
A Y indicates rejection at the 90% level of a t-test of equality of the pre-2001 and post-2001 coefficients. 
B  Y indicates rejection at the 90% level of a t-test of equality of the coefficients of the two groups pre-2001. 




Table A2.1: Meetings-to-change. Explaining the forecast error: geography, macro conditions and history 
 
coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err.
Distance:
Headquarters in Frankfurt -0.376 ** 0.191 -0.547 0.358 -0.289 0.228 -0.198 0.208 -0.557 0.394 -0.077 0.248
Subsidiary in Frankfurt -0.066 0.198 -0.161 0.375 -0.013 0.236 0.081 0.210 -0.170 0.403 0.156 0.248
HQ or Subsidiary in London -0.206 0.150 -0.372 0.299 -0.124 0.175 -0.165 0.151 -0.375 0.303 -0.081 0.176
Vicinity to Frankfurt -0.115 0.166 0.053 0.321 -0.155 0.198 -0.062 0.168 0.052 0.322 -0.068 0.202
Macro conditions:
Relative inflation 0.066 0.089 0.078 0.167 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.094 0.081 0.173 0.000 0.000
Relative unemployment -0.026 0.030 -0.067 0.045 0.000 0.000 -0.038 0.031 -0.066 0.046 0.000 0.000
History:
Central bank independence -0.166 ** 0.077 0.009 0.142 -0.207 ** 0.094
# observations 3199 951 2248 3199 951 2248
(1) (2)
pre-2001 post-2001full period pre-2001 post-2001 full period
 
 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively. 
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# obs mean diff. st. dev. 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 1999-2005 1999-2005
Austria 49 5.44 5.885 -- 4.25 1.76 2.39 8.36 11.08 -- 2.12 5.66 4.42 5.85
Belgium 0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Denmark 112 5.00 4.392 6.01 3.99 2.31 3.99 8.75 9.52 4.54 2.86 5.29 4.83 5.09
Finland 83 4.87 5.705 0.51 1.87 2.35 8.33 9.23 2.34 1.48 5.34 0.51 4.98
France 264 5.46 5.659 6.17 3.67 2.07 3.37 9.96 11.00 5.67 2.61 5.84 4.20 6.11
United Kingdom 1113 5.51 5.926 4.88 3.76 2.31 3.55 10.92 9.50 3.53 2.46 5.97 3.98 6.09
Germany 887 5.20 5.437 5.90 3.46 1.95 2.90 10.62 9.86 3.58 2.45 5.61 4.27 5.65
Ireland 56 3.84 *** 3.895 -- 4.13 2.02 3.56 4.68 8.57 3.98 2.00 4.15 3.97 3.77
Italy 101 3.89 *** 4.244 6.81 3.64 1.65 2.20 7.88 7.04 -- 2.26 4.15 3.94 3.83
Netherlands 111 5.33 4.858 5.15 4.59 2.21 3.19 10.10 9.08 3.12 2.39 5.66 4.59 5.51
Portugal 121 6.01 6.266 8.02 3.65 1.95 2.69 14.22 11.64 5.68 2.25 6.42 4.06 6.86
Sweden 42 5.89 5.451 7.36 4.88 1.82 2.50 12.48 9.25 3.33 2.36 6.36 5.03 6.19
USA 63 4.50 5.807 7.31 4.80 2.46 3.08 11.73 -- -- 3.04 4.78 5.01 4.33
Others 197 5.65 6.379 7.33 3.59 2.21 2.47 12.72 9.48 2.93 2.47 6.03 4.42 6.19
Euro area 1,754 5.21 5.524 6.03 3.62 1.95 2.92 10.38 10.02 3.99 2.37 5.60 4.18 5.67
Non-euro area 1,445 5.43 5.789 5.46 3.83 2.33 3.39 11.00 9.42 3.52 2.52 5.86 4.21 5.92
All countries 3,199 5.31 5.645 5.80 3.71 2.12 3.14 10.67 9.74 3.77 2.44 5.72 4.19 5.78
meetings with
1999 - 2005 Feb. 2001
 
 
Notes: -- indicates missing values; "diff." shows significance level of a t-test of whether the country-specific mean is different from the mean for all countries. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively. 
 36
 coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err.
Distance:
Headquarters in Frankfurt -0.404 ** 0.159 -0.848 *** 0.307 -0.258 0.187 -0.221 0.173 -1.058 *** 0.339 0.018 0.202
Subsidiary in Frankfurt -0.211 0.165 -0.586 * 0.324 -0.097 0.192 -0.062 0.174 -0.771 ** 0.347 0.122 0.201
HQ or Subsidiary in London -0.232 * 0.125 -0.760 *** 0.257 -0.050 0.143 -0.190 0.126 -0.821 *** 0.260 0.007 0.143
Vicinity to Frankfurt -0.220 0.138 -0.306 0.276 -0.194 0.162 -0.166 0.140 -0.324 0.276 -0.081 0.165
Macro conditions:
Relative inflation 0.021 0.074 -0.223 0.144 0.000 0.000 -0.042 0.078 -0.170 0.148 0.000 0.000
Relative unemployment -0.006 0.025 -0.060 0.039 0.000 0.000 -0.018 0.025 -0.050 0.039 0.000 0.000
History:
Central bank independence -0.170 *** 0.064 0.180 0.122 -0.270 *** 0.077
# observations 3199 951 2248 3199 951 2248
(1) (2)





Table A2.3: Meetings-to-change. Explaining the Taylor-type rule systematic error: geography, macro conditions and history 
 
 





coef. std. err. coef. std. err. 2001A
HICP inflation -327.731 *** 49.812 -90.657 *** 23.576 Y
M3 -22.133 ** 10.416 -81.169 *** 12.076 Y
Industrial production -63.470 *** 7.998 -7.255 * 3.886 Y
Consumer confidence -0.460 *** 0.038 -0.447 *** 0.042
Previous rate 2.137 *** 0.382 1.532 *** 0.221
pre-2001 post-2001
Table A2.4: Meetings-to-change. Taylor-type rule estimates 
 
(A)  All groups 
 
 
(B)  By group 
pre-2001 post-2001 pre- pre-2001 post-2001 pre-
vs. vs.
post- post- pre- post-
coef. coef. 2001A coef. coef. 2001A 2001B 2001C
Vicinity
HICP inflation -272.566 *** -81.806 ***
M3 -13.624 -83.252 ***
Industrial production -69.203 *** -9.044 **
Consum *** -0.394 *** -0.454 ***
Previous *** 3.067 *** 1.705 ***
Macro
HICP in -387.337 *** -82.789 *** Y Y
M3 *** Y -51.816 ** -63.455 ***
Industri ** Y -56.599 *** 0.575 Y Y
Consum *** -0.403 8**
Y -499.493 *** -104.789 * Y Y
Y -41.629 -68.472 **
Y -50.672 *** -0.079 Y
er confidence -0.491 *** -0.449




al production -84.249 *** -20.257
er confidence -0.610 *** -0.518 * -0.459 *** Y
Previous *** 2.217 *** 1.687 ***
Macro
HICP in ** Y -290.127 *** -66.750 ** Y
M3 *** Y -55.034 * -61.751 ***
Industri Y -67.361 *** -2.647 Y
Consum *** -0.360 *** -0.508 *** Y Y
Previous *** Y 1.711 *** 1.883 *** Y
Histor
 rate 1.359 1.605
 conditions
flation -409.893 *** -80.758
-32.975 ** -85.106
al production -53.220 *** -3.740
er confidence -0.532 *** -0.440
 rate 2.689 *** 1.521
y
HICP in *** Y -454.308 *** -56.500 Y
M3 *** Y -94.295 ** -53.880 **
Industri ** Y -54.424 *** 1.065 Y
Consum *** -0.364 *** -0.387 ***




outside Frankfurt HQ or subsidiary in Frankfurt
comparison
flation -283.530 *** -105.638
-21.004 * -94.161
al production -64.634 *** -10.888
er confidence -0.468 *** -0.494





Notes:  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% level, respectively. 
A Y indicates rejection at the 90% level of a t-test of equality of the pre-2001 and post-2001 coefficients. 
B Y indicates rejection at the 90% level of a t-test of equality of the coefficients of the two groups pre-2001. 
C Y indicates rejection at the 90% level of a t-test of equality of the coefficients of the two groups post-2001. 

























level? Low when? 
Invesco Asset Mgt Frankfurt 0 0 40 25 35 Feb -50 2.00 3.00 2.00 Sum 02 
Standard Chartered London 0 0 40 40 20 Feb -50 2.00 3.00 2.00 - 
American Express London 0 0 60 30 10 Feb -25 2.00 2.50 2.00 Q3-02 
Exane Paris  0 0 70 20 10 Feb -25 2.50 4.00 2.00 Q2-02 
WIFO Vienna 0 0 20 70 10 Feb -50 2.50 4.25 2.25 Autum-02 
Natexis Banques Populaires Paris  0 0 10 65 25 . . 2.50 3.00 2.50 Mar-02 
…. …. …. …. …. …. …. …. …. …. … … …. 
HSBC  London 0 0 60 25 15 Feb -50 2.75 . 2.50 Apr/May 
Dresdner Bank Frankfurt 0 0 60 20 20 March -50 3.50 . 2.75 Mar-02 
Commerzbank Frankfurt 0 0 65 30 5 Feb/Mar -25 3.00 4.25 2.75 Q2-02 
RBS Financial Markets London 0 0 67 25 8 Feb -50 3.25 4.25 2.75 Feb 
Sal Oppenheim Cologne 0 0 70 20 10 Feb -25 3.50 4.00 2.75 Mid-02 
Halifax  London 0 0 70 25 5 .  -25 2.75 4.00 2.75 May-02 
Stone & McCarthy London 0 0 70 25 5 Feb -25 3.50 4.25 2.75 End Q1- 02 
CitigroupSSSB London 0 0 75 20 5 Feb -25 3.25 4.00 2.75 Q2-02 
Nordea Group Helsinki 0 0 80 15 5 Feb -50 3.25 . 2.75 Q1/02 
Alpha Bank Athens 0 0 80 20 0 Feb -25 3.25 3.75 2.75 Q1-02 
Rabobank Utrect 0 0 85 10 5 Feb -25 3.25 3.50 2.75 Apr 
Hypovereinsbank Munich 0 1 85 13 1 Feb -50 3.25 . 2.75 . 
Standard & Poors MMS London 0 0 90 9 1 Feb -25 2.75 4.00 2.75 Q2-02 
Banco Santander Lisbon 0 0 50 50 0 Feb -25 3.25 4.00 3.00 Q1-02 
Fortis Bank Amsterdam 0 5 60 25 10 Feb -25 3.00 3.50 3.00 Q1/Q2 
West LB Duesseldorf 0 0 70 25 5 Feb -25 3.25      4.00     3.00  Q1 
Sanwa London 0 0 75 25 0 Feb -25 3.25 4.00 3.00 Q1-02 
AM Generali Finanz Cologne 0 0 90 10 0 Feb -25 3.75 4.50 3.00 Feb-02 
Bankgesellschaft Berlin 0 0 90 10 0 Feb -25 4.00 . 3.00 Feb-02 
Investors Bank & Trust Boston 0 1 98 1 0 March -25 3.50 4.25 3.00 March 
Nomura International Frankfurt 0 0 100 0 0 March -25 3.00 4.00 3.00 March 
 
Note: Shortened sample. Entries in the third to seventh column refer to probabilities (in percent). 
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